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Virtue ethics, character education and empirical psychology have had a rocky relationship. From the perspective of psychology, as far back as the 1930s Hartshorne and May’s Character Education Inquiry is believed to have dealt a ‘death blow’ to the very idea of character education​[1]​ from which it has yet to recover. Modern writers interested in the interplay between philosophy and psychology have also been dismissive of a possible role for character education. Gilbert Harman sets aside the very possibility of character building in a one-sentence paragraph, which, in its brevity, makes up the entire section devoted to moral education​[2]​. John Doris suggests that educating for virtue may well be futile as character traits lack the relevant robustness. In addition he suggests that if we accept that the virtues are rare phenomena, it becomes unclear whether there is a role for the virtuous agent in education​[3]​. At the same time, from the perspective of philosophy, while virtue ethics has seen a substantial revival in research interest in the last few decades, few philosophers have taken up Elizabeth Anscombe’s original call for a shift of attention to moral psychology​[4]​. With some notable exceptions, such as the work of Owen Flanagan and Joel Kupperman, philosophers have not taken up this aspect of Anscombe’s call leaving philosophers as disconnected from the empirical sciences now as we were when the paper was written in the 1950s.
In this chapter I want to take up the specific question of the relationship between moral education and empirical findings in psychology. I will argue that moral education programmes are theoretically possible and would benefit in their practical application from empirical research already in existence in psychology. I will argue that situationism does not pose a threat for moral education, properly conceived, and that, in fact, educators can and should make use of situational factors. It strikes me that much of the debate in this field is hampered by incomplete or partly inaccurate understandings of the main concepts, in addition to conflicting versions of what it is that we should be aiming for in the first place. Therefore I will start by a brief account of what morality is, what we should expect from moral character education and which aspects of Aristotelian virtue ethics are relevant to these endeavours. 
2. The Goals of Character Education
This section covers a large number of ideas in a very concise manner which may leave a lot of questions unanswered. Nevertheless I have included it as it is difficult to talk about the process of moral indication without some conception of what it is that we are aiming at. If the goal of moral education is to help people become better, more moral, more virtuous human beings we cannot fully account for how to do so unless we understand what we are aiming for. Morality has conceptual links with agency, voluntariness and responsibility. Morality involves choice, i.e. an expression of our agency, which need not involve conscious deliberation but does involve an affirmation, both rational and affective, of what has been chosen. When we make moral choices we express, through these choices, aspects of ourselves and display our values, interests and commitments through them. The reason why we hold people responsible for their moral choices, in terms of both praise and blame, is because they are an expression of who they are, an expression of theiragency. These thoughts also account for the relevance of voluntariness to morality, as genuine choice requires freedom. We hold people morally responsible for what they have freely chosen to do, what they had control over.
The first relevant point for our discussion is that we should not automatically assume overlap between the philosophical and the psychological understandings of these terms. The above, philosophical understanding of morality is not relevant to all the traits that come under the psychological inquiry into character. For example, some psychologists are interested in the prevalence of expressive movements as a character trait in a population​[5]​, which is a morally neutral behaviour.
The second point is that this particular conception of morality already gives us some hints as to what we should expect to find in a successful character education programme. Indoctrination and rote repetition are unlikely to foster the personal growth and independence of spirit required for meaningful moral choice. Blind rule following is not compatible with taking responsibility for one’s choices, while compliance which is wholly due to fear of punishment or which is wholly motivated by the desire for external rewards is incompatible with actions that proceed from ethical values that are acted upon for their own sake. However, at the same time, this conception of morality is similarly incompatible with a values free-for-all relativism. The very idea of holding agents responsible for their moral choices supposes that these choices must in some way be defensible and open to being judged. Freedom to choose involves the freedom to get it wrong and just because one’s actions are an expression of one’s deepest held beliefs, it does not mean that these beliefs cannot be criticised and found wanting. When we make moral choices we invest of ourselves in the choice but the genuineness of the choice is no guarantee of its rightness.
What should we expect then from a programme of character education? There are two possible answers to this question. One suggests that we can’t expect anything, because character is simply an illusion. The other assumes that character traits exist, accepts that they can be shaped, changed and developed in accordance with an educational goal, but still retains the idea that such a project would be difficult, lengthy and fraught with pitfalls. I will suggest that the second answer is the correct one, character education is possible, but it is a difficult project and one which is not easily captured in a transferable, simple, and easily practically applicable programme of education. One implication of this claim is that there are limits to the specificity of any practical guidance in moral education. If there is a practical science of character education, to borrow an argument from Aristotle, it can only be as exact as the subject matter allows. Character education, like ethics, is an imprecise subject matter, one that does not admit to an overriding principle, one that cannot be fully captured in an easily applicable set of rules, one that requires sensitivity to context.One answer will not suit all, and adaptability and flexibility may be the key. Rather than looking for a specific set of guidelines that can be applied at a national or even international level, we should be looking at the qualities of the people who teach character education and giving them the support required to help them tailor their approach to the needs of their individual students. 
There are two concerns with any attempt to over specify the practicalities of a character education programme. The first is a temptation to expect a successful character education programme to deal with the ills of the day, whichever way these may be conceived. In this spirit there are politicians and researchers who aspire for character education to change the sexual habits of young adults, to lead them away from a life of crime and drug use, and make a difference to the rate of unemployment, often assuming that a number of social ills are the result of the moral failings of young people​[6]​.The more precisely these targets are laid out, the more contentious they become and it is easy for the call for moral education, a perfectly reasonable aspiration for all our children in the abstract, to be hijacked, in practice,by particular causes. The aim to educate, to better, to improve, to nurture, risks getting lost in whatever political, ideological or personal agendas are behind the particular goals identified as the ills that education should seek to remedy.
The second is a theoretical concern. As we shall see below the virtuous response is always contextualised so any attempt to inculcate very specific behaviours may well backfire. For example, obedience to school authorities sounds like a reasonable goal, one that might make the lives of school teachers easier and one that might teach students to comply with established social norms and thus avoid some of the kinds of social ills education researchers are specifically concerned with. However, it is fairly easy to imagine situations where defiance may be the correct attitude towards authority. For example, non-cooperation is the morally correct response to an unjust rule. Behaviours such as highlighting the rule’s injustice, bringing attention to its unfair repercussions and refusing to contribute to its application, may all well be morally laudable responses. 
Even in a less contentious context the virtues of a good student, such as diligence, obedience to authority, ability to follow instructions, and academic achievement are not necessarily the virtues of a good person, which might rather be traits such as autonomous decision making, independence, critical thinking, and emotional maturity​[7]​. Over-specifying and misidentifying the goals of moral education programmes risks resulting in educational efforts that are more concerned with short-term behavioural modification than long term character development​[8]​. 
3. Situationism and Character Formation
Much of interest has already been said on virtue ethics and its response to the situationist challenge​[9]​ so I will only briefly highlight some ideas that will be particularly relevant to us. The relationship between the virtues and context is a complex one, with a variety of different influences playing a role. It is important to note that, according to Aristotle, the virtues are not the only character states one may possess, and that not all character states are identical. There is a big difference between the virtues as settled, reliable and predictable dispositions, that one arrives at after years of gradual development, and the many states of character that one may go through during this development. So while the end goal, virtue, is static, in the sense that once it has been achieved it is settled, reliable and unchanging, the road to virtue passes through a number of dynamic states. 	
Virtue is a settled state because it involves a choice of the noble and the good. This choice has both rational and affective elements and is made in response to morally relevant circumstances in the world.	That is, morally salient elements in the situation provoke a virtuous response. Virtue is static in the sense that when a virtuous response is required, the virtuous person can be relied upon to respond appropriately each time. However, the circumstances which require virtue are themselves diverse. One cannot decide in advance of the particulars of the situation what will be the virtuous response and the content of virtue cannot be determined in advance of the context that gives rise to the moral demand. So, for example, one cannot specify in advance whether the kind response is to directly help an individual in need with his immediate concerns, or to contribute to a charity that alleviates the root causes of these needs, or concern oneself with the global causes of injustice that perpetuate a system that generates these needs in the first place. But one can rely on the virtuous person to do what virtue requires each time. 
The claim that virtue is stable and predictable is a complex one. This is not a point which is lost to psychologists either. For example, Cervone and Shoda write “Coherence across time is revealed not only in stability of action, but in meaningful patterns of change when people face changing environmental demands…Coherence across contexts is revealed not only in stable mean levels of response, but in variations in cognition and action from one context to another”​[10]​. The virtuous person can be relied upon to do (and feel) the right thing each time, but what that right thing will be, will vary with circumstances. Character trait stability over time is itself a dynamic concept in that its expression changes depending on what is required by different circumstances. It would be very simplistic to assume that just because a trait itself is stable, for example one is always kind, that the expression of this trait is always identical in changing circumstances, such that one always does the same thing in the attempt to be kind regardless of what the circumstances require. Character coherence does not require blind reproduction, but a more sophisticated reliability, one that tracks the shifting demands of the good.
However, since moral development is a gradual process, one that is subject to failures and regressions, there are many other states of character of relevance here that do not exhibit the stability of virtue. The student of virtue will have an unformed and pliable character, one whose development can be influenced by external factors. Such factors include role models, parental influence, exemplars, peer groups, educators, opportunities for the practice of morality, temptations and pressures, and so on. While virtue is context sensitive in the sense that its expression is influenced by the demands of the situation, the developmental character states on the road to virtue are dynamic in the sense that their very development and formationare influenced by situational factors. This is also not a point lost on psychologists. For example, Bandura’s studies of modelling show how dispositions like a tendency towards aggression go through constant modification as a consequence of interactions with the environment​[11]​.
The interrelationship between situations and character continues:one’s character colours how one views the world, in a way that may also further encourage the expression of certain aspects of one’s character. For example, the fearful person may interpret a number of elements in his interaction with others as threatening and intimidating, which in turn may push him towards defensive actions that provoke others to see him and react to him as a fearful person. A person’s character leads him to view certain situations in a particular light and certain situations bring out specific elements of a person’s character. This is both an Aristotelian point​[12]​ and one found in, for example, social-cognitive approaches to personality​[13]​. Psychologists recognise that the same situation, e.g. a noisy party, or a particular parental style, may be perceived differently, e.g. as fun for a sociable person and as torturous for a shy person, and lead to different behaviours, e.g. compliance from a submissive child or disobedience from a rebellious child​[14]​.
The long process by which our emotions come into line with our reason through habituation, the development from doing ‘the that’ to understanding ‘the because’ and the progression from incontinence to continence are all examples of developmental processes in character formation. The role of moral education is to guide, shape and control situational factors so that they exert as positive an influence as possible on these dynamic character traits. Since these character traits are undergoing constant modification as a consequence of their interaction with the environment, if we control the environment, we can encourage character development in the right direction. 
4. Control the Situation, Shape the Character
The main insight of all this for educators is not whether behaviour is dispositional or situationally motivated as two mutually exclusive causes, but rather that character traits are dispositions whose development and actualisation into behaviour are shaped by situations. As such this aim is also shared by some psychologists, even some coming from surprising quarters. Hartshorne and May write in the Character Education Inquiry report:
 The large place occupied by the ‘situation’ in the suggestion and control of conduct, not only in its larger aspects, such as the example of other pupils, the personality of the teacher, etc., but also in its more subtle aspects, such as the nature of the opportunity to deceive, the kind of material or test on which it is possible, the relation of the child to this material, and so on, points to the need of a careful educational analysis of all such situations for the purpose of making explicit the nature of the direct or honest mode of response in detail, so that when a child is placed in these situations there may be a genuine opportunity for him to practice direct methods of adjustment​[15]​. 
Far from dismissing any possibility of moral education (as some commentators interpret them​[16]​)Hartshorne and May have specific recommendations on how it can be undertaken. Indeed much of their discussion is a rejection of direct methods in favour of indirect methods of teaching, rather than a rejection of the possibility of teaching morality altogether. 
The difference between direct and indirect methods of teaching is a blurred one, but, in general, direct refers to teacher centred teaching, done at a definitive time and place, with specific materials for the instruction of moral character. In the next section I will defend a possible role for more direct methods of teaching, but it is important to note that Hartshorne and May’s conception of the direct methods they wish to reject is not one that would be advocated by an Aristotelian in the first place. Hartshorne and May understand as direct the ‘mere urging of honest behaviour by teachers’​[17]​ and see themselves as arguing against the claim that pupils possess a ‘secret reservoir of honest virtue’​[18]​ which can be appealed to by educators. However, neither of these are claims that a virtue ethicist would want to defend either. Virtue does not proceed from a secret reservoir, a mysterious power or an innate ability; we are not engendered by nature with virtue, but we have the capacity to develop virtue through habituation. Developing this capacity is a long and complex process and it would be naïve to think that it can be achieved at the mere urging of others. Indirect methods of teaching are perfectly compatible with virtue ethics and indeed are the kinds of suggestions Aristotle makes for character development. Therefore there is no immediate conflict between the psychological findings on the influence of situations on behaviour and the virtue ethical claims that character can be developed and educated.
I will contend that one of the main tasks of educators is to stage manage situations to help people develop the right habits. Most personality psychologists, including for example critics of trait theory such as Mischel, accept that traits most reliably express themselves in situations that are suited to their expression,​[19]​ therefore the task of educators is to shape situations so as to lead to the expression of the right traits. To develop the character trait of honesty, educators must provide situations that are conducive to honest behaviour; and it is by practicing honest behaviour that students will develop the ability to withstand the temptations to be deceitful​[20]​. The more students become used to withstanding the temptations to be deceitful, the easier it will be for them to do so next time, until the force of the temptation becomes negligible and honesty becomes a disposition that flows easily and effortlessly into practice. Psychological studies from across the board in the debate over the existence of traits accept the complex relationship between traits, behaviours and situations. For example, a study of highly aggressive children found that they displayed behaviours central to the trait of aggressiveness, such as pushing and shoving, and that these behaviours increased in response to situational pressures​[21]​. 
Two experimental findings are relevant here: first, it is important to recognise that a situational manipulation will have different influences in different contexts; second, it is equally important to accept that although small factors influence behaviour in radical ways, becoming aware of these influences negates their impact. I will consider each in turn​[22]​.
5. Contexts of Situational Manipulations
On the first point, the work of Arnold Buss is relevant. Bussargues that the influence of traits on behaviour and the influence of situational manipulations on behaviour depend on the kind of situation, or context, the agent is in. In novel, formal and public contexts, with detailed and complete instructions, offering little or no choice, of brief duration and with narrowly defined responses, manipulations are more influential. Whereas in familiar, informal and private contexts, with general or no instructions, offering considerable choice, of extensive duration and broadly defined responses, traits are more influential​[23]​. So, for example, at a dinner party, a situation which is formal, public and ruled by social norms, manipulations are likely to have a greater influence and can derail our usual habits. Atypical behaviour on the other hand is difficult to maintain over a long period of time, or when we are relaxed, informal and allowed free expression without the guidance of a specific set of instructions. 
Buss sees the following features emerge in the study of behaviour:
1.	In public and formal situations we have a tendency to be conformists. In the public eye, unsure of ourselves, we take our cues from others and therefore we become more susceptible to situational manipulations. Many experiments that confirm the importance of manipulations are carried out in formal, public and novel settings. By contrast in familial, relaxed, at ease situations, a person’s habitual tendencies are more likely to emerge.
2.	Laboratory experiments usually involve precise and clear instructions which make subjects less likely to exhibit independent personality traits. By contrast personality research tends to consider unstructured situations and observations of subjects in a natural setting more likely to promote the expression of personality traits.
3.	Laboratory studies are of short duration and it is easier for subjects to conform to modes of behaviour that are not habitual as well as conceal certain tendencies. It is difficult to maintain atypical behaviour over time, so shorter studies will confirm the importance of manipulations, while longer ones will come to the opposite conclusion.
4.	In a laboratory setting responses are measured precisely and such narrowly focused, specific responses are more likely to be influenced by manipulations. Aggregating responses over time brings out the importance of character traits. 
Interestingly Buss’s insight might explain the importance of situational manipulations in shaping behaviour in experiments such as Milgram’s which are held in formal, closely controlled settings.
To further complicate matters Buss cites a number of studies that show the importance of manipulations and traits interacting. Subjects who are more self-conscious are also more likely to feel discomfort and want to leave if manipulated in a situation where they feel more socially aware​[24]​. Or subjects who are low in self-esteem find that their performance is severely affected by failure, whereas subjects who are high in self-esteem do not​[25]​.
Educators can make use of Buss’s insight in two ways: first, faced with situations where manipulations are influential they can take control of those manipulations and ensure that students are exposed to the ones which encourage the best behaviour; second, faced with students who have the rudiments of the right character traits in place, educators can shape situations to offer freer expression of these character traits in order to be able to reward their manifestation in action. 
An important aspect of this part of moral education is managing failure. Failure is an inevitable part of the moral life, but it needn’t necessarily be a negative part of moral development. Failure, properly managed to ensure that it is not catastrophic, devastating or over-whelming, can be a source of self-knowledge and improvement. Shaping situations to provide appropriate tests of temptation, duress and pressure, even when these tests result in current failures to master the temptation, to overcome the duress and resist the pressure, can still be useful sources of knowledge, self-development and future self-improvement, as well as sources of ammunition for avoiding failures in the future​[26]​. “If we bend so easily before the winds of situational pressures, then we need opportunities during the development, if not to face the strongest winds, at least to deal with some of the complexities and pressures of real situations”​[27]​. It is the role of educators to manage the contexts of failure, so that rather than being overwhelming, it becomes a lesson one learns from.
Indeed it is the task of educators to influence as far as possible all the external factors that shape character, such as peer groups and role models. Experimental studies show that children who are exposed to an aggressive model become more aggressive​[28]​, while subjects who see others litter follow by example​[29]​ and subjects who see others conserve water by switching off showers follow suit​[30]​. Gino, Ayal and Ariely tested whether subjects’ tendency to cheat was affected by the dishonest behaviour of others and noted that the behaviour of confederates perceived by subjects as belonging to the group they identified with had a particularly strong influence. Observing an in-group peer behave unethically increased the subjects’ likelihood of doing so as well, while observing an out-group peer behave unethically had the opposite effect. So not only do in-group members become direct standards for modelling behaviour, but out-group members serve as reverse role models drawing attention by their unethical behaviour to the subjects’ own ethical beliefs and thus reinforcing the subjects’ ethical behaviour. Gino et al conclude that 
Our findings suggest that relatively minor acts of dishonesty by in-group members can have a large influence on the extent of dishonesty, and that techniques that help to stigmatize the bad apples as out-group members and strengthen the saliency of their behavior could be useful tools to fight dishonesty​[31]​.
They also mention that similar findings regarding the importance of the overall ethical climate and culture in influencing moral behaviour have been noted in larger groups and organizations​[32]​. It is interesting to note that these kinds of experiments that seem to confirm a role for the expression of character traits take place in conditions that conform to Buss’s insight, e.g. familial, private, offering choice and of extensive duration.
6. Knowledge is Power
The second experimental finding is that while small factors have impressively large influences on our behaviour, becoming aware of these factors can negate their influence. Surprised by how small and inconsequential factors easily change our moral behaviour, it is tempting to conclude that it is difficult to overcome the influence of these factors. If we become even more willing to administer what we believe to be powerful electric shocks simply because the person urging us to do so is wearing a white coat and carrying a clip board​[33]​, if benefiting from finding an amount as tiny as a dime is sufficient to push us into a helping mood​[34]​, if perfectly ordinary people only need to knowingly play act at being guards and prisoners to turn into moral monsters in a matter of days​[35]​, then it is easy to be led into assuming that the influence of these factors is irresistible and all pervasive. Consider Doris who argues: 
Given how counterintuitive it is to suppose that such factors [small situational variations] powerfully influence behaviour, it is no surprise that people typically pay them little attention, and even in the unlikely event that people developed situationist suspicions in the ordinary course of things, it would be difficult for them to engage in the systematic observation requires to put such suspicions to the test​[36]​.
However, this is theoretical speculation on the part of Doris and actual empirical evidence suggests the opposite is in fact true.The key to resisting contrary situational factors appears to be to not only become aware of them, but to become aware of their influence through a detailed debriefing that makes subjects aware of the processes that created and reinforced the beliefs and behaviours in the first place. Such ‘process debriefing’ results in the effect of these small but influential factors being eliminated​[37]​. It appears that the best way to avoid the Fundamental Attribution Error is to become aware of our propensity to make it. In addition some authors report success with such methods particularly in educational contexts.​[38]​Practical applications of this idea include using social psychological lectures to increase rates of shoplifting reporting​[39]​ and to increase helping behaviours​[40]​.So the answer to our surprise at the influence of tiny factors on our moral behaviour is twofold: firstly we should use education in order to manage these factors so that only positive ones are allowed to influence behaviour, and secondly we should become properly aware of the influence of negative ones so that their effect is eliminated​[41]​.
Doris may respond here that these situational factors are too numerous and too difficult to predict and the problem persists nonetheless. To an extent this is a practical question. I will accept that more empirical research is needed to determine how many complicating factors are too many, how often are particular individuals able to overcome the influence of situational factors by becoming aware of them before fatigue sets in, whether the influence of some situational factors is more resistant to becoming aware of them than others, what other contextual elements affect our ability to become aware of situational factors that affect us, etc. The empirical project is certainly complex but it is not already determined as Doris’s analysis would lead us to believe. Furthermore, its very complexity is not a theoretical threat to virtue ethics either. Virtue ethics acknowledges and turns into an advantage the complexity of the human life. We should not shy away from complicated answers, but embrace them both as a practical challenge and as a correct description of the richness of human endeavours. 
7.The Role of the Virtuous Agent
According to an influential account of virtue ethics, the virtuous person plays a central role in the understanding of the theory as he acts as an exemplar for virtue. This conception of the role of the virtuous person has attracted criticisms on a number of counts​[42]​ some of which are of particular relevance to education. For example, if the virtuous person is a role model we would need to ensure that all teachers are perfectly virtuous which is quite a strenuous and unrealistic demand. However, as I have argued elsewhere​[43]​, this is a misconception of the role of the virtuous agent. Aristotle’s definition of virtue as a purposive disposition, lying in a mean that is relative to us and to the situation and determined by rational principle and by that which the virtuous man would use to determine it​[44]​, tells us that we should not be looking at the virtue person directlybut at the rational principle (orthos logos) and at how to determine it. If virtue is rare, we may well struggle to find the virtuous person (aside from any concerns about identifying her in the first place), and if the application of virtue is context and person sensitive, it is not clear how we would benefit from a direct copying of her behaviour anyway. However, in a sense we should not be looking for the virtuous person as such, we should be looking for the deliberative qualities exemplified by the virtuous person. Accepting that these qualities are exemplified in an ideal degree in the virtuous person is perfectly compatible with suggesting that the same qualities exist in an imperfect manner in less than virtuous agents. The task of the educator should be to help his students develop the qualities that can be used to determine the rational principle. These qualities are moral perception and moral judgement. Doing so doesnot require a direct appeal to the virtuous agent. In what follows I develop some practical ideas on how this can be done with direct reference to evidence from psychology experiments.
One of the first steps in moral education is to become aware of the world as a place that imposes moral demands on us. This may seem a simple and immediate task, but I think that anyone who has spent time teaching ethics, especially in a context with practical applications like professional ethics or research ethics committee training, will know that it is nothing but simple and immediate​[45]​. Students have to become sensitised to the world as a moral place, they have to come to see the world in a particular way, they need to perceive the morally relevant features of situations. Can experimental psychology confirm the suggestion that becoming sensitive to the world as morally active is a significant factor in behaving ethically?
There is quite a lot of evidence from experimental psychology to suggest that faced with moral reminders people behave a lot more ethically. While some experiments assume that religious people will behave more ethically than non-religious people and then go on to disprove this hypothesis, Malhotra found that the right question is not ‘Does religion make people nicer?’ but rather ‘When does religion make people nicer?’​[46]​. Religious people are not more prone to ethical behaviour as such, insteadfrequent exposure to religious norms is likely to make morality more salient and therefore moral behaviour more frequent. The experiment tested the subjects’ likelihood to bid on charity auctions and found significantly more responses on days when morality had been made salient, e.g. following the Sunday sermon. Nor is this the only case in point, participants who were asked to recall the Ten Commandments were significantly less likely to cheat given the opportunity, even when standing to gain financially from cheating, than the control group​[47]​. Such experiments suggest that students may well benefit from the presence of moral reminders in their everyday life and from learning techniques that will encourage them to remind themselves of their moral beliefs before acting. 
Variations of these types of experiment also seem to suggest that setting situations up in such a way that participants identify with their actions as expressions of their agency, as actions they can be held morally responsible for, increases ethical behaviour. Priming participants to believe in determinism results in higher levels of dishonesty than priming them to believe in free will​[48]​. Asking participants to sign an honour code seems to operate as an ethical reminder and a personal commitment to morality which makes it less likely to cheat even in cases where there is no specific cost for dishonesty​[49]​. Simple changes like asking participants to sign at the top of tax return forms prior to filling them in, rather than at the bottom, seem to operate both as honesty reminders and as ways of strengthening the connection between the person and his actions so that he feels immediate responsibility for his choices​[50]​. The experiments seem to suggest that taking ownership of our actions, strengthening the connection between what I do and what I am held responsible for, affects moral behaviour. It wouldn’t require much effort to implement these insights in educational contexts.
Moral judgement has many theoretical components which I suspect could be fruitfully linked to research in psychology, among them the development of moral imagination, the interplay between cognitive and affective elements of the reasoning process, the strengthening of willpower, and so on. It is not possible to develop all these themes in this chapter so I will concentrate on one aspect of moral judgement that involves direct engagement with moral concepts and reasoning (partly in response to concerns regarding the efficacy of direct methods of moral education raised earlier). While learning by rote, indoctrination and mere repetition of rules is unlikely to affect anyone’s beliefs, values and commitments, learning about moral concepts in an environment that encourages critical thinking, self-reflection and active engagement with the ideas under discussion may lead students to greater self-understanding and encourage them to question their existing beliefs in favour of greater consistency and coherence in their overall views. Practical skills involved in successful moral discussions such as being able to express one’s views, being able to understand other viewpoints, accurately pinpointing similarities and differences, being intellectually tenacious without being personally offensive, and so on, contribute both to one’s understanding of morality and to one’s character.
In a pattern that should be becoming familiar by now there exists empirical evidence which confirms the suggestion that thinking critically about morality should be a part of character education. One, admittedly small, study showed that the teacher’s skills in leading moral discussions in a manner consistent with the Socratic elenchus was the most important variable in eliciting substantial, positive character change​[51]​. While studies such as this one are typically small, conclusions may be drawn from considering that they all arrive at similar conclusions. A review of character education assessment programmes concludes that 
[t]here are nearly 100 separate studies of the effects of classroom discussions of moral dilemmas on, typically moral reasoning development. Cumulatively, there is strong evidence that classroom moral dilemma discussions promote significant development of moral reasoning competencies. Similarly, there are many studies of the impact of cooperative learning. These studies (and reviews of the studies) demonstrate consistent significant impacts on conflict resolution skills, cooperation, and academic achievement​[52]​.
Finally I want to conclude by drawing special attention to the role of the teacher who acts as a particularly influential role model, and can do so without necessarily being a perfectly virtuous agent. The role of teachers as role models is clearly significant. Hartshorne and May report one particular class who stood out by far in terms of dishonesty from their peers in other classes. Intrigued by the results they re-tested the same group the next year, by which time they were being taught by a different teacher, only to find that the spike in dishonest behaviour was gone. Unfortunately, the influence of one teacher was enough to push an entire class into dishonesty, although, fortunately, the very same factor, a new teacher, could reverse the negative influence. By the end of the academic year, led by a different teacher, the same class had gone from being the most dishonest to being the most honest​[53]​. 
To affect this kind of change the teacher does not have to be perfectlyvirtuous, but he does have to show a commitment to morality that applies to his conduct to the same extent that he expects it to apply to the conduct of his students​[54]​. The role of the teacher is to function as an example of how to think rather than provide the content of what to think. The process of learning how to think focuses on the road to virtue, a developmental project, rather than the end result, the virtuous agent. As such, students can learn from many aspects of their teacher’s conduct, including very importantly, his failures. Moral failures are inevitable for fragile, vulnerable creatures such as us. The correct response to the possibility of failure is not to deny it but to use it. In an educational context it does not matter so much whether a teacher will make moral mistakes but rather how he will respond to them. For example, a constructive response to moral failure is to recognise the mistake, make amends as appropriate and be committed to doing better next time. These are all examples one can and should be learning from​[55]​. 
8. Conclusion
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